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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Section 78-2-2(j) Utah Code
Annotated.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the proceeds deposited pursuant to eminent domain statutes requiring
interest at the rate of 8% per annum as part of just compensation, where the proceeds are
deposited in court to be paid forthwith but cannot be forthwith withdrawn, are deemed
"trust funds" subject to provisions of a separate statute relating to persons depositing
money in court, to be held in trust for other purposes. The trial court's interpretation is
reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. See
Butterfield Lumber. Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp.. 815 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Utah App.
1991); Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
2. Whether the Administration of the Judiciary Rule 3-407(3) excludes money
deposited pursuant to eminent domain statutes by defining trust accounts as those
established for the benefit of third parties and stating as examples those funds held for
restitution, child support and bail amounts. The court's interpretation is provided no
deference and is reviewed for correctness. Id
3. Whether the appropriation of interest on money deposited in eminent domain
proceedings is in effect the imposition of a tax which the courts are without constitutional
power and authority to assess to be reviewed for correctness. RL Utah Constitution Art.
XIII Section 5, vests power to tax in political subdivisions. Smith v. Carbon County. 90
Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259, 108 ALR 513 (1936).
4. Whether the appropriation of interest on money deposited in eminent domain
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proceedings is a civil fee, which must be set by statute, not judicial rule. Section 21-1-5
Utah Code Annotated. Article XXII Section 2, Constitution of Utah provides for the
legislature to establish fees collected by all offices. The trial court's decision is reviewed
for correctness. See Butterfield. 815 P.2d at 1332; Berube, 771 P.2d at 1038.
5. Whether it is inherent in the definition of "trust" that the Trustee appropriate the
funds for use of the beneficiary and not to itself.
6. Whether it is necessary to perfect a property right by procedural rules where a
constitutionally perfected and protected right gives rise to the property right.
7. Whether the state of Utah can appropriate and retain interest earned on the
principal amount belonging to the Appellants in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
8. Whether governmental immunity statutes are applicable to cases where another
statute or the Constitutions allow suit notwithstanding governmental immunity in other
cases.
Paragraphs 5-8 are all questions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. See

14
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY AND RULES PROVISIONS
SET FORTH IN THE ADDENDUM.
Section 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated.
Article I Section 7, Utah Constitution.

3

Article I Section 22, Utah Constitution.
Article XIII Section 5, Utah Constitution.
Section 21-l-5(bb) Utah Code Annotated, "There is no fee for service or filing of
documents not listed in this section or otherwise provided by law."
Article XXII, Section 2, Utah Constitution.
Article V, Section 1, Utah Constitution.
Section 78-27-4 Utah Code Annotated.
Administration of the Judiciary Rule 3(407)(3)(f).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case.
This is an appeal from the Findings and Judgment of the trial court granting the
Appellees' motion to dismiss the Complaint before answer or other proceedings, denying
the Appellants' demand for payment of interest deposited by the Utah Department of
Transportation in an eminent domain proceeding.
B. Course of proceedings.
Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), filed a Complaint under its eminent
domain rights to acquire part of the land of Security Investments Ltd. ("Security") and
William K. Olson ("Olson") located in Woods Cross, Utah, for highway purposes.
UDOT joined several other entities as defendants who are either financial institutions or
tenants who were shown of record to have an interest in the entire parcel, of which only a
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small part was taken. The action was filed against Security on March 7, 1997, and against
Olson on March 14, 1997. The defendants, other than Security, did not disclaim until
April 1999 and as to Olson until some time in February and March 1999. UDOT had
previously deposited $292,350.00 for Security and $139,300.00 for Olson with the Clerk
of the Court pursuant to Section 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated, on August 18, 1997 for
Security and on May 20, 1997 for Olson pursuant to Orders Of Immediate Occupancy.
Security and Olson claimed an entitlement to interest on the deposited funds. The
Clerk and Administrative Office of the Court refused to pay interest earned on money
deposited with the Clerk by UDOT without order of the Court, claiming that funds
deposited with the Clerk by UDOT pursuant to the eminent domain statute are "trust
funds" held under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-4, and were subject to Judicial
Council rules, Rule 3-407(3)(F) which provides in part:
(iii) For interest-bearing accounts established at the request of the
litigant or by court order, an administrative fee, in an amount established by
the Council, shall be assessed.
UDOT did not request that the funds be deposited in an interest bearing escrow account
nor did any of the nine defendants, none of whom could have withdrawn the money until
resolution of the entitlements because UDOT did not specify the amounts of which it
claimed each was entitled to under the statute and the other claimants refused to disclaim
until as late as April 1999, although the Orders of Occupancy required that the money
deposited be remitted to the appropriate defendants.

5

The Complaint alleged:
That the Clerk, upon advice and direction of the Administrative Office of the
Courts, ("AOC"), by Daniel J. Becker, ("Becker'*), refused to pay any interest, claiming
that the interest was paid upon funds held in trust pursuant to §78-27-4 Utah Code
Annotated and Judicial Council Rule 3-407(3)(F) and such became a deposit in a
restricted account for the Judicial Council.
That the AOC and Becker refused to authorize payment of interest to Security
without a further court order. The Court denied Security's motion for the payment of
interest. The accrued interest is being held by some officer or agent of the State of Utah,
and held under control of some of the Defendants, who have authority and obligation to
release the same to the Plaintiffs, and said interest or the equivalent thereof should be
ordered to be paid to Security.
That for similar reasons, Olson is entitled to interest on money deposited with the
Clerk on May 20, 1997, in the sum of $139,300.00, pursuant to an Order of Immediate
Occupancy signed May 12, 1997, to be effective when "Plaintiff herein has deposited
with the Clerk of the Court, for the use and benefit of the defendant parties in interest
herein, in the full dollar amount of plaintiffs approved appraisal" and to be remitted
upon receipt to appropriate defendants.
That for similar reasons advanced against Security, the Clerk and AOC by Becker,
refused payment of interest to Olson, and the Court on June 30, 1999, granted Olson's
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motion for payment of the principal deposited, however, allowing Olson to withdraw the
principal without prejudice to the right of appeal on the interest issue.
That Security and Olson appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in
separate appeals, No. 990369, and No. 990652, which denied any interest claim against
UDOT, but stated: "Moreover, we decline to address defendants' argument that the clerk
of the court, and/or any other persons in control of the monies deposited by UDOT or
any interest earned thereon, should pay such interest to defendant, as such persons are not
parties to this appeal."
That upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the Clerk and any other
persons in control of the monies deposited by UDOT and the interest thereon, are the
Defendants named herein, and to the extent that other persons are later to be found to be
identified as persons in control, the Plaintiffs reserve the right to add such person or
persons as defendants.
That Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." The Utah
Supreme Court in the case of Webber v. Salt Lake City. 40 Utah 221, 120 Pac. 503,
(Utah 1911), holds that this constitutional provision is self-executing and required no
legislative aid.
That the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155, 66 L Ed. 101, (1980), held that the county,
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taking as its own, under authority of a Florida statute, the interest on money deposited in
an interpleader fund, is a taking which violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. The Court further stated that interest on the deposited
fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the
owners of that principal.
The Supreme Court followed the holding of the Webb's case in Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), where interest on Lawyers Trust
Account (IOLTA) by statute is paid to foundations to finance legal services for lowincome individuals. The Supreme Court held that the interest was the property of the
client which is private property of the owner of the principal and that the taking thereof
violates the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
That any and all of the named defendants individually or in conjunction with
others or each other owe to the plaintiffs all interest earned on money deposited in said
eminent domain proceedings, and to the extent that it cannot be reasonably, accurately
calculated, then the interest should be calculated at the highest legal rate of 10% per
annum or in any event at 8% per annum as provided by Eminent Domain statutes.
That the Defendants violated the civil rights of the Plaintiffs by an unlawful
taking and retaining of their respective properties without due process of law contrary to
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their rights
under Article I Section 22 Constitution of Utah. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
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States Code provides:
1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party inured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of this District of Columbia.
Plaintiffs demanded judgement against the defendants having possession and or
control of the interest on the deposited funds.
(1) For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned on the money deposited
for the use and benefit of Security Investment LTD in the original principal sum of
$292,350.00;
(2) For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned on the money deposited
for the use and benefit of William K. Olson in the original principal sum of $139,300.00;
(3) For damages and attorneys fees for violation of Plaintiffs' civil rights in taking
property by governmental action without due process of law as proved at trial;
(4) For costs; and for other relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled to by law.
A copy of the Complaint is attached in the appendix.
C. Disposition at the Trial Court.
The Defendants-Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint supported by a
memorandum. The Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a memorandum responding to
9

Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial court heard arguments of the parties
and subsequently issued a "Ruling on Defendants' Motion To Dismiss," granting the
Defendant-Appellees' motion to dismiss based upon the "findings" as follows:
1.

The State of Utah and the Administrative Office of the Courts, and
defendants Brown, Alter and Becker in their official capacities, are not
"persons" under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

2.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite affirmative causal link
between the actions of the defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injuries.

3.

Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the UDOT interest funds at
issue. Having no property right, there was no unconstitutional taking of
plaintiffs' property, and therefore no violation of plaintiffs' constitutional
rights.

4.

Defendants Brown and Becker are entitled to quasi-judicial and qualified
immunity.

5.

Defendant Alter is entitled to qualified immunity.

6.

The Court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The relevant facts have been stated in the STATEMENT OF THE CASE, and
since there was no evidentiary hearing, no other facts were developed. Since the
disposition in the trial court was a judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the allegations of the Complaint must be construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v.
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Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995).
The trial court was construing legal issues for the most part and the factual
allegations were not disputed as acknowledged by the trial court in its RULING ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Funds deposited pursuant to eminent domain proceeding are not "trust funds" as
defined in the statute governing money, deposited in court to be held in trust. Interest on
money deposited in eminent domain proceedings is part of "just compensation" mandated
by the constitution of the United States, The State of Utah and by statute to be paid the
Plaintiff who are entitled to the principal.
2. Eminent domain deposits are not the type of deposits defined by Rule 3-407(3)
Administration of the Judiciary as "Trust Accounts" which include restitution, child
support and bail amounts. Interest thereon was never intended by the rule to be
appropriated by the state. The rule of ejusdem generis would limit the court rule to the
types on deposits which are similar to the examples.
3. Article I Section 7, Constitution of Utah requires due process of law in
condemnations, and Section 22 prohibits a taking without just compensation. Section 7834-9 Utah Code Annotated states that "judgment shall include, as part of the just
compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally
awarded as the value of the property and damages

11

"

The appropriation of interest on principal deposited pursuant to eminent domain
proceedings by the State, violates the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and violates the civil rights of the Plaintiffs by an unlawful
taking of their respective properties without due process of law contrary to the provisions
of the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of the United States Constitutions.
4. Requiring a forfeiture of interest on the statutory entitlement is in effect a tax
imposed by the judiciary without authority to tax.
5. Civil fees are set by statute, not by the courts. The legislature is to establish
fees collected by all offices. As an involuntary defendant-landowner in eminent domain
proceedings, Plaintiffs should not be assessed costs which forfeits their right to interest,
doubling their sacrifice to public necessity.
6. Under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and The Governmental
Immunity Act §63-30-10.5, Defendants are not immune from suit.
ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE TAKING BY THE DEFENDANTS OF INTEREST ON PRINCIPAL
DEPOSITED IN THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS VIOLATES THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
The allegations of the Complaint raise issues of taking private property in violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and violate Plaintiffs'
civil rights by an unlawful taking of their respective properties without due process of law
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contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their
rights under Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah.
We review two decisions of the United States Supreme Court as being the law
determinative of the issues in the instant case. The first case is Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies.
Inc.. et aL v. Beckwith. 449 US 155, 66 L. Ed 2d 358, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980), where on certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida because the taking of
interest on funds deposited with the clerk of the court was a taking which violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Eckerd's of College Park, Inc. agreed
to purchase for over $1.8 million, substantially all of the assets of Webb's. At closing Webb's
debts appeared to be greater than the purchase price. Eckerds filed a complaint in the
interpleader joining Webb's and two hundred of Webb's creditors, and tendering the purchase
price to the court which ordered the tendered amount to be paid to the clerk to be deposited "in
an assignable interest-bearing account at the highest interest." The court reserved decision on
interest entitlement without prejudice to creditors' claim to the interest. The interest earned
totaled more than $100,000.00 of which the clerk retained $9,228.74 as his fee. The court
appointed a receiver and directed the clerk to pay the accumulated interest to the receiver for the
creditors. The clerk appealed to the Supreme Court stating that the deposited fund is "public
money" and that the Florida statute takes only what it creates and there is no unconstitutional
taking because interest earned on the clerk's registry account is not private property. The holding
of the Supreme Court of the United States in comment [8] is as follows:
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree, may
accomplish the result the county seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as "public
money" because it is held temporarily by the court. The earnings of a fund are incidents
of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property. The
13

state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of the use of
the fund for the period in which it is held in the registry.
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into
public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in
court. This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
meant to prevent. That Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental
power.
IV
[lc] We hold that under the narrow circumstances of this case—where there is a
separate and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk's fee "for services rendered" based
upon the amount of principal deposited; where the deposited fund itself concededly is
private; and where the deposit in the court's registry is required by state statute in order
for the depositor to avail itself of statutory protection from claims of creditors and others-Seminole County's taking unto itself, under § 28.33 and 1973 Fla Laws, ch 73-282. the
interest earned on the interpleader fluid while it was in the registry of the court was a
taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We express no view as to the
constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county's retention of interest earned, where
the interest would be the only return to the county for services it renders.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed.
It is so ordered.
In both the Olson and Security cases the Order of Immediately Occupancy in compliance
with the statute provided the following:
"This Order shall not be effective until the Plaintiff herein has deposited with the Clerk of
the Court, for the use and benefit of the Defendant parties in interest herein, the fiill dollar
amount of Plaintiffs approved appraisal of the Defendants' property to be acquired in this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on receipt of said moneys, the Clerk of this Court shall
remit the same to the appropriate Defendants in the percentage and portion to which each is
entitled."
It is clear that the money deposited with the Clerk in these eminent domain proceedings
was for just compensation and was never public money or trust funds.
The second pertinent decision of the United States Supreme Court which cites with
approval the Webb's case is Phillips et al. v. Washington Legal Foundation et al.. 524 U.S. 156
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(1998). Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, an attorney who
receives client funds must place them in a separate, interest-bearing, federally authorized "NOW
account upon determining that the funds "could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for
the client or [that] the interest which might be earned is not likely to be sufficient to offset the
cost of establishing and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs and tax
reporting costs which would be incurred in attempting to obtain the interest." IOLTA interest
income is paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF), which finances legal
services for low-income persons. An attorney and his client sued TEAJF and others alleging that
the Texas IOLTA program violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment which provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation. The district court
granted summary judgment to TEAJF which was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court whose
opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The holding of the United States Supreme Court is
summarized in the syllabus as:
Interest earned on client funds held in IOLTA accounts is the "private property" of the
client for Takings Clause purposes. The existence of a property interest is determined by
reference to existing rules or understandings stemming from an independent source such
as state law. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577. All agree
that under Texas law the principal held in IOLTA accounts is the client's "private
property." Moreover, the general rule that "interest follows principal" applies in Texas.
See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155,162. Id at

A. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PERFECT A PROPERTY RIGHT IN A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERFECTED AND PROTECTED RIGHT.
The trial court's judgment of dismissal of the claim for interest stated:
3. Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the UDOT interest
funds at issue. Having no property right, there was no unconstitutional
taking of plaintiffs' property, and therefore no violation of plaintiffs'
15

constitutional rights.
The Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges:
13. Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Webber v. Salt Lake City.
40 Utah 221, at 224, 120 Pac. 503, (Utah 1911), holds that this
constitutional provision is self-executing and required no legislative aid.
The Webber decision further states that since the action was based upon a constitutional
provision, a statute of limitations of one year created by statute was not applicable and a
four year statute was applicable. See Webber at 224-225. A statute cannot diminish a
constitutional right.
Therefore, there was no necessity for the Plaintiffs in this action to "perfect" a
property right in the UDOT interest funds, in that the constitution perfected and protected
that right.
The Webber decision further explained at 224:
As we have pointed out, the constitutional provision existed when
section 282 was adopted. Moreover, the right to recover damages would
continue precisely the same, although section 282 were repealed. If a right
or liability — call it what you will — therefore, existed before section 282
was adopted, such right or liability was not created by that section. Again,
if the right or liability will continue in full force and effect, although that
section were repealed, such right is not even exercised by virtue of that
section. In other words, for the purposes of an action like the one at bar,
the provisions of section 282 are not controlling or even material.
From what has been said, it follows that this action is not based
upon section 282. Even though it be conceded, therefore, that the
provisions of subdivision 1 of section 2877, supra, are applicable to section
16

282, yet, as this action is based upon the constitutional provision to which
we have referred, this action is not affected by section 2877.
B. CAN THE STATE RETAIN INTEREST EARNED ON PRINCIPAL
BELONGING TO A PRIVATE PARTY IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The Complaint cites two United States Supreme Court cases which hold that the
taking by the State of interest earned on principal belonging to a private party is a taking
which violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 66 L Ed 2d 101 (1980);
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
Earlier Supreme Court cases confirming Plaintiffs' right to interest as a part of just
compensation cited to the trial court are as follows:
United States v. Rogers. 255 U.S. 163, 168-170 (1920) required the United States
government to deposit interest at 6 % per annum and to pay the same because this was
not a claim against the United States as such but "Having taken the lands of the
defendants in error, it was the duty of the government to make just compensation as of
the time the owners were deprived of their property."
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U.S.. 261 U.S. 299 (1923) cited the Rogers case at page
305 and held at page 305,~"Just compensation is provided for by the Constitution and the
right to it cannot be taken away by statute."... "The owner's right does not depend on
contract, express or implied. A promise to pay is not necessary."
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United States v. Worley. 281 U.S. 339, (19 ) states, "An implied agreement to
pay interest arises upon taking by the United States of private property for public use
where interest is an element of just compensation guaranteed by the Constitution.
Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. United States."
The Utah Supreme Court in Seigel v. Salt Lake City. Cottonwood, Etc.. 655 P.2d
662, 669 (Utah 1982) held that it was error for the trial court not to allow interest at 8%
per annum as part of just compensation provided by §78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated.
Seaboard Air Lines Ry v. United States supra also stated: "The requirement that
'just compensation' shall be paid is comprehensive and includes all elements and no
specific command to include interest is necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part
of such compensation."
A recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Anthony
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, et al.. No. 99-2047 decided June 28, 2001, reversed the
decision of the Rhode Island State Supreme Court which held that Palazzolo had no right
to challenge regulations predating his acquisition of title to real property which prevented
his development of the property under the regulations restricting use of coastal wetlands.
The Court held:
The State's rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of
property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to
transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation. The State
may not by this means secure a windfall for itself. See Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164, 66 L. Ed. 2d 358, 101 S.
Ct. 446 (1980) ("[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
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property into public property without compensation"); cf. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 Yale L. J. 73/5, 1368-1369 (1993) (right to transfer
interest in land is a defining characteristic of the fee simple estate). The
proposed rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect. The young owner
contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the resources to hold
contrasted with the ownei with the need to sell, would be in different
positions. The Takings Clause is not so quixotic. A blanket rule that
purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes
ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for
what is taken.
The Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155, 66 L. Ed. 2d
358, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980) decision stated the rule that:
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by
judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by
recharacterizing the principal as "public money" because it is held
temporarily by the court. The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership
of the ftind itself and are property just as the fund itself is property. The
state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the
value of the use of the fluid for the period in which it is held in the registry.
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform
private property into public property without compensation, even for the
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is the very kind of thing that
the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental power.
Applying the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Palazzolo and Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies to the Security and Olson claims, the state statute §78-27-4 UCA
and Judicial Council Rule 3-407(3)(F) cannot deprive Security and Olson of just
compensation including interest which is mandated by Utah and United States
Constitutions which predate the statutes and regulations and were self executing.
Security and Olson were entitled to interest as provided by §78-34-9(5)(c)(i) as
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part of just compensation awarded, at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally
awarded as value of the property from the date of actual possession of the property by
UDOT or the date of the order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of
judgment. Since interest was not due and payable until the date of judgment, no claim to
interest could be made by Security and Olson until after the date of judgment. Security
and Olson made request prior to the date of judgment for interest from both the
Administrative Office of the Courts and the District Court. No payment of interest has
been made and apparently the District Court and the Administrative Office of the Court
rely upon statutes and regulations as a basis for denial of the prior constitutional right to
interest.
It is undisputed that the state has taken the interest which was duefromthe date of
judgment. Olson and Security had no obligation to request interest either before or after
judgment because the federal and state constitutions provided that right without
restriction or reservation. UDOT and the District Court would not release the money
deposited by UDOT until determination of entitlement among multiple defendants was
concluded. The State of Utah through its agencies withheld the money deposited. No
one else benefitted or could benefit from the money so deposited. The party who claims
to be entitled to be relieved from payment of interest on money deposited should be the
party required to comply with any administrative rules which relieve itfrompayment of
interest. In this case, the State of Utah is the party claiming for itself the interest which it
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is obligated to pay to the condemnees. As stated in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, the
"State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without
compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in court" because this is
prevented by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which
is a shield against arbitrary use of governmental power. Olson and Security had no duty
or obligation to perfect an entitlement to interest by some regulatory request where that
entitlement was mandated by Constitution. See Hayden v. Board of Cty. Commissioners,
580 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo 1978), Utah County v. Brown. 672 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1983).
Also, no notice or claim is necessary in condemnation action to recover just
compensation. Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, (Utah 1990);
Wilson v. Beville. 306 P.2d 789,

(Cal 1957).

POINT II. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT.
The Governmental Immunity Act §63-30-10.5 provides:
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from
suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from
the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property for public uses without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of
Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
Article I, Section 22 is also self executing. The Supreme Court in William J. Colman v.
Utah State Land Board: Ralph Miles. Director Utah Division of State Lands et aL 795
P.2d 622, 635 (1990) stated:
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In sum, article I, section 22 needs no legislation to activate it; it is mandatory
and obligatory as it is. See Utah Const. Art I, §24.
The trial court concluded that Southern Pacific acted as the State's contractor on
the causeway breach project and was therefore protected by the State's immunity.
Since we hold that the State is not immune, Southern Pacific can no longer
depend on the State's immunity.
See also Hamblin v. City of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990) where the city was
not immune for damages accruing after a flood; and Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794
P.2d 838, 847 (Utah 1990) where the County was not immune from an inverse
condemnation claim because Article I Section 22 creates this claim.
Since the statute specifically provides that interest is a part of just compensation,
there can be no immunity of any defendants from suit for interest withheld as well as the
continuing acts under color of statute and rules depriving Plaintiffs of just compensation.
The law is clear by the Supreme Court decisions reviewed above that Plaintiffs should be
paid the interest withheld, and the continued refusal of the Defendants is a clear violation
of § 1983 for which they have no immunity.

POINT III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CASES
WHERE ANOTHER STATUTE OR THE CONSTITUTION ALLOWS SUIT.
Cases; Adkins v. Div. Of State Lands. 719 P.2d 523 (Utah 1986)
Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990)
El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray Citv Corp.. 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977)
Bennett v. Bow Vallev Development Corp.. 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990)
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Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990)

POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
The Plaintiffs5 claims for interest as a part of just compensation having its basis in
the Constitutions of the United States and Utah are not subject to the notice and other
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Since the claims under § 1983 may be subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, the Plaintiffs have, on February 7, 2001 served an additional notice upon the
Defendants and offered to deposit $300.00 as specified in the act. (The Plaintiffs already
had on deposit with the Clerk of this Court $300.00 each in connection with the previous
appeal to which Plaintiffs were entitled to a refund).
We review now the cases on entitlement to interest as part of just compensation,
even though the statute specifically so states. The early United States Supreme court
cases, which have never been contradicted aire as follows.
Beginning with United States v. Roger. 255 U.S. 163, 168-170 (1920), the
Supreme Court held that the United States could not be required to pay interest before
possession, however even in absence of statute, the United States was required to deposit
interest at 6% per annum and pay the same because this was not a claim against the
United States as such but "Having taken the lands of the defendants in error, it was the
duty of the government to make just compensation as of the time when the owners were

23

deprived of their property."
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U.S.. 261
U.S. 299, Justice Butler cited the Rogers case (p. 305) and held at page 304:
Section 10 of the Lever Act authorizes the taking of property for the public use
on payment of just compensation. There is no provision in respect of interest.
Just compensation is provided for by the Constitution and the right to it cannot be
taken away by statute. Its ascertainment is a judicial function. Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States. 148 U.S. 312, 327.
The compensation to which the owner is entitled is the full and perfect
equivalent of the property taken.... It rests on equitable principles and it means
substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he
would have been if his property had not been taken. United States v. Rogers
(C.C.A., Eighth Circuit), 257 Fed. 397, 400. He is entitled to the damages
inflicted by the taking. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North American Telegraph
Co. (C.C.A., Eighth Circuit), 230 Fed. 347, 352, and cases there cited.
The United States in effect claims that the owner is entitled to no more than the
value of the land, as of date of taking, to be paid at a later time, when ascertained.
The owner has been deprived of the land and its use since the taking, May 23,
1919. The value of the property, as ascertained by the President, was $235.80,
and this was allowed with interest from date of taking. But as judicially
determined later, the value when taken was $6,000.
The owner's right does not depend on contract express or implied. A promise
to pay is not necessary.
(Emphasis added).
In 1930, Justice Butler's opinion in United States v. Worley. 281 U.S. 339 which
involved a disability claim in which interest was claimed on installments denied payment
of interest but contrasted the case with just compensation cases citing the Seaboard Air
Line Ry. case stating:
The rule is that the United States will not be required to pay interest except
where the liability is imposed by statute or assumed by contract. An implied
agreement to pay interest arises upon a taking by the United States of private
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property for public use where interest is an element in the just compensation
guaranteed by the Constitution. Seaboard Air line Ry. v. United States.
The foregoing cases make it abundantly clear that interest in eminent domain
proceediiigs is founded upon just compensation and cannot be diminished or taken away
by statute. The Utah Supreme Court in Siegel v. Salt Lake City. Cottonwood. Etc.. 655
P.2d 662, 664 (Utah 1982) held:
[3] Finally, Siegel contends that the trial court committed error in not awarding
interest on the damages awarded. Section 78-34-9 provides that in an award of
damages for taking in eminent domain the "judgment shall include, as part of the
just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount
finally awarded as the value of the property and damages, from the date of taking
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is
earlier."
The evidence is that the Sanitary District's entry into SiegeFs premises occurred
on November 19, 1976. It follows as a matter of law that he is entitled to interest
on his award from that date at 8% per annum as provided in the statute just
quoted.
Remanded for modification of the judgment to conform with this opinion. No
costs.
POINT V. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTIONAL
REASONING TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF INTEREST TO PLAINTIFFS,
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULE WAS NEVER INTENDED TO APPLY TO
INTEREST EARNED ON PRINCIPAL DEPOSITED IN EMINENT DOMAIN
CASES.
In support of this point, the arguments advanced in a previous appeal by Olson in
Supreme Court No. 990652SC are restated.
A. JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES EXCLUDE THE SUBJECT INTEREST BY
DEFINITION.
Eminent domain deposits are clearly excluded from the Judicial Council rules by
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definition.
Rule 3-407(3) Trust accounts, contains the following definition:
"(3) Trust accounts.
(A) Definition. Trust accounts are accounts established by the courts for the
benefit of third parties. Examples of funds which are held in trust accounts include
restitution, child support, and bail amount."
Eminent domain deposits have no similarity to the examples stated, and none of
the examples are required by statute to be deposited. As stated in W.S. Hatch Co. v
Public Service Commission. 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809 (Utah 1954), "Another
universally accepted rule which is brought to assistance in arriving at the intention
manifest in written documents is that of fejusdem generis1 meaning 'of the same kind1
which rule is stated thus: When general words or terms follow specific ones, the general
must be understood as applying to things of the same kind as the specific". Id. at 11.
Another leading case on ejusdem generis which has been cited in several following
Utah decisions is that ofHeathmanv Giles. 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839 (Utah 1962).
In Heathman, Justice Crockett wrote:
[1] When there is doubt or uncertainty as to the interpretation of a statute
there are two well-known rules of statutory construction which are helpful.
The rule of noscitur a sociis, literally "it is known from its associates,"
requires that the meaning of doubtful words or phrases be determined in the
light of and take their character from associated words or phrases.
Sutherland in his treatise on Statutory Construction states:"... where two
or more words are grouped together and ordinarily have a similar meaning,
but are not equally comprehensive, the general words will be limited and
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qualified by the special words."
[2] Another closely related rule which is universally accepted as valid is
that of ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same kind." which rule is that:
when general words or terms follow specific ones, the general must be
understood as applying to things of the same kind as the specific.
These are, of course, neither artificial nor arbitrary rules but arise
quite naturally from the process or reasoning as to what the statute was
intended to mean. Common sense and experience teach that when a group
of related things are specifically enumerated, the mind is focused upon that
class of things, and that the addition of general terms is purposed to avoid
inadvertent omission and to include like things of the same class. In accord
with this is the fact that if the broadest meaning of the general expression
were intended, it would have been sufficient by itself without any use of the
specific terms.
374P.2dat40.
Heathman was cited and followed in subsequent cases: Matter of Disconnection of
Certain Territory 698 P.2d 544,547-548 (Utah 1983) (Justice Oaks); Nephi City v
Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989) (Justice Zimmerman); and State v Vogt 824 P.2d
455, 458 (Utah App. 1991) (Judge Russon).
It appears that the intention of the provisions relating to deposit of trust funds was
to cover costs of administering non-mandated funds such as restitution, child support and
bail, which can be ordered by the court but which are not mandated by law. See Section
78-27-4(3)(b) Utah Code Annotated. The amount of interest which could be forfeited by
Plaintiffs far exceeds costs in that if earned interest is only 5% per annum, not
compounded, when applied to $292,350.00 for Security, annual interest is $14,617.50.
For the period August 14, 1997 through April 23, 1999, a term of twenty (20) months,
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interest at 5% would amount to $24,358.00. When applied to $139,300.00 for Olson, to
an annual interest is $6,965.00. For the period May 27, 1997 through July 26, 1999, a
term of twenty-six (26) months, interest at 5% would amount to $16,913.78.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF INTEREST ON DEPOSITS IS IN EFFECT AN
UNAUTHORIZED TAX.
Article XIII Section 2(1) Constitution of Utah provides:
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained by law.
Money on deposit has never been taxed, nor have trust funds been taxed, presumably
because deposits of money and trust funds are not tangible property. In any event, if such
taxes were authorized by the constitution, the same are required to be uniform and equal.
Taxing only trust funds1 interest on money deposited in court, but not taxing deposits and
trust funds generally, violates the uniform and equal constitutional requirements.
We quote from the opinion Smith v. Carbon County. 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259,
108 ALR 513 (1936) where the main issue was whether a statute requiring payment of a
fee for filing an inventory and appraisement in an estate, graduated to the value of the
estate. The Court held in part as follows:
[1] The first question which presents itself for determination is: Do the
various amounts enumerated in the foregoing scheduled in excess of $10
constitute a fee or tax? The mere fact that the Legislature has characterized
them as fees is not controlling if the burden sought to be imposed on estates
is devoid of the essential characteristics of a fee. The adjudicated cases
define the fee of an officer as "reward or compensation allowed by law to
an officer for specific services performed by him in the discharge of his
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official duties." If the amount required to be paid upon the filing of an
inventory and appraisement to the county clerk may reasonably be said to be
in payment for services rendered in probate proceedings, the objections to
the act based upon article 13, sections 2, 3 and 5 of our State Constitution
must fail. The converse is equally true; that is to say, if the amount required
to be paid in a given case for filing an inventory and appraisement does not
bear some reasonable relation to the extent and kind of services required to
be performed, the money so required to be paid, no matter how it is
characterized by the Legislature, may not be said to be a fee. Defendant
does not contend to the contrary. It does contend that the services required
from a clerk and judge in probate proceedings are, in the main, in
proportion to the appraised value of the estate, that the more valuable the
estate the greater the time required of the clerk and judge in the probate
thereof. Defendant also contends that the responsibility of the judge and the
clerk increases in proportion as the value of the estate being probated
increases. Because of such facts, so it is urged by defendant, the different
amounts required to be paid for filing an inventory and appraisement may
properly be held to be fees. If the premise assumed by defendant as the
basis for its argument is in fact true, there would be merit to its contention.
Experience, however, teaches us that the amount of service required in a
probate proceeding of the clerk and judge do not depend upon the appraised
value of the estate being probated, but rather upon such matters as the
number of heirs, legatees, or devisees, the number of creditors, the character
of the property being probated, number of sales of property sought in the
probate proceedings, etc. Nor are we impressed with the argument that the
extent of responsibility assumed by the clerk and judge becomes greater as
the value of the estate is increased. Neither the judge nor the clerk is
charged with the actual management, custody, or control of the property of
the estate. Those duties are performed by the administrator or executor.
The clerk's duties are confined to filing and preserving the paper filed,
giving the required notices, etc. The duty and responsibility is the same
whether the estate be of great or little value. Nor may it be said that the
responsibility of the judge to perform his duties, as by law provided, is
enhanced because, in a given matter, the estate in which he is acting is of
great value. The judge and clerk are each paid a fixed salary. The amount
of such salary is not dependent on the size of the estate probated in the court
in which they are officers. The arguments here made in support of the view
that provisions such as those here brought in question may be sustained as
fees have ben before the courts of a number ofjurisdictions. The cases to
which our attention has been called are uniform in holding that statutory
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provisions fixing, in probate proceedings, a schedule of fees increasing as
the appraised value of the estate increases, have held that such fees in
excess of the minimum provided for, are in contemplation of law, not fees,
but taxes. From what we said, we do not wish to be understood as holding
that the Legislature must fix fees payable in all probate proceedings the
same. What we do hold is that the amount of fees that may be exacted must
bear some reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the services
rendered. Otherwise such fees are, in contemplation of law, taxes. That
being taxes, they must be uniform and may not be levied by the Legislature
for the use and benefit of a county. It follows that the law fixing the
schedule of fees attacked in this action must fail because in conflict with the
constitutional provisions relied upon by plaintiff.
(citations omitted).
Id. at 260. The rationale of the Smith v. Carbon County appears to support appellant's
claim that the interest appropriation is an unlawful tax which neither the legislature nor
the courts may impose and collect.
C. CIVIL FEES ARE TO BE SET BY STATUTE NOT BY COURT RULE.
Assuming that a fee may be charged for services in handling trust funds, the same
are to be set by statute. Article XXII Section 2, Constitution of Utah provides for the
legislature to establish fees collected by all officers. The legislature is restricted in
delegation of its power by Article V Section 1 of the Utah Constitution which divides
powers into three distinct departments, the Legislative, Executive, and the Judicial. No
person charged with exercise of power properly belonging to one of these departments,
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others. Rule 3 -407(F) (iii)
demands a fee in an amount "established by the Council".
D. THE RATES FOR CHARGES FOR SERVICES IN TRUST FUNDS
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ESTABLISHED BY THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARE THE INITIAL
INDICATION OF THE COSTS RELATED THERETO.
Assuming that the charges established by the Judicial Council pursuant to Rule 3407(F)(iii) are an indication of the extent of charges to be exacted from litigants, the
actual charges to Security resulting from the forfeiture of interest far exceed the schedule
of charges established by the rule.
The Clerk of the District Court of Davis County has provided information on rates
established by the Council as being a $50.00 minimum, or 0.647% of the principal
amount deposited.
In the instant case, the amount on deposit by UDOT was $292,350.00. 0.647% of
$292,350.00 is the sum of $1,891.50 which is almost 37 times greater than the minimum
of $50.00, and as such appears to be excessive under the principles set forth in Smith v.
Carbon County. 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259, 108 ALR 513 (1936). Adding further to the
disparate charges as it relates to the cost of service, in this case if Security is required to
forfeit interest earned at an assumed rate of five percent per annum, they will have been
charged, and forfeited twenty months of interest (August 14, 1997 to April 23, 1999).
Five percent per annum equals 0.4167 per month resulting in a forfeiture of interest of
$24,360.00. (0.4167 x $292,350.00 = $1,218.00 x 20 = $24,360.00). Asidefromthe
legal reasons reviewed above, it is doubtful that the Judicial Council ever considered the
charges to apply to eminent domain proceedings.
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POINT VI. THE TRUSTEE OF AN INVOLUNTARY TRUST SHOULD BE NO
LESS TRUSTED THAN OTHER FIDUCIARIES.
Lawyers should agree that no special citations are needed to expect a trustee of
public funds to be just as responsible for protecting the assets of the true beneficiary as is
expected of all trustees.
Here we have the statute requiring a deposit in eminent domain for the use and
benefit of the ultimate owner who is entitled to eight percent interest on all non-deposited
damages, and such owner is confronted by subsequent statutes and rules which would
appropriate interest to the use of the Trustee. No where in the statute does there appear
the right of anyone but the owner to receive the interest "as part of the just compensation
awarded." Apart from other legal considerations, this does not seem appropriate conduct
for persons trained in law.

CONCLUSION
The Court should remand the case to the District Court to determine the interest
earned on money deposited in this case, and to order the clerk and other parties in control
of the funds to pay the earned interest to the Plaintiffs to avoid unfair double sacrifice by
Plaintiffs as an involuntary defendant-landowner surrendering land for public necessity
and receiving less than just compensation. Since eminent domain is based upon public
necessity, let the public pay to manage the funds.
This Court could resolve the controversy by deciding that the Judicial Council did
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not intend that its rule apply to principal deposited in eminent domain proceedings.
Respectfully Submitted

rge K. Fader
Attorney for the Plaintiffs-Appellants
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, and WILLIAM
K. OLSON, individually and BILL
OLSON INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah
limited partnership, by William K.
Olson, General Partner,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
civil no.OVQ^IQI;^
vs.

Judge:

5J

fAOi^

ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second
Judicial District Court, Farmington
Utah; The STATE OF UTAH by and
through its state treasurer,
WILLIAM T. ALTER; its Administrative Office of the Courts, DANIEL
J. BECKER, Administrator, and THE
STATE OF UTAH, by any officer or
agency receiving interest on funds
deposited in courts,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs complain of the defendants and for causes of action
allege:
1.

Security Investment LTD

(Security) is a Utah limited

partnership named as a defendant in an eminent domain action in the
above-entitled court, Civil No. 970700108, wherein Utah Department
of Transportation (UDOT) is names as plaintiff.
2.

William K. Olson (Olson) was named as William K. Olsen in

an eminent domain action in the above-entitled court, Civil No.
1

97070014,

The property which was condemned is also referred to as

property of Bill Olson Investment LTD, William K. Olson, General
partner, the present real property

in interest.

UDOT is the

condemnor named as plaintiff in said action.
3.

Jurisdiction of this Court is provided by Section 78-3-

4(1) Utah Code Annotated.
4.

Allyson Brown (Clerk) is the Clerk of the Second Judicial

District Court, Farmington, Utah.
5.

The legal issues regarding the claims of Security and

Olson are identical and both arose in connection with the same road
project for which UDOT commenced eminent domain proceedings to
acquire portions of the tracts of the plaintiffs.
6.

On or about August 19, 1997, UDOT paid $290,600 to the

Clerk of the above-entitled court pursuant to Section 78-34-9 Utah
Code Annotated, and the Order of Occupying dated August 14, 1997
provided that:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on receipt of said

moneys, the Clerk of this Court

shall remit the same to the

appropriate Defendants in the percentage and proportion to which
each is entitled."
There were eight other entities named as Defendants, none of
whom were entitled to any^percentage or portion of the deposited
funds, although some laid claims to entitlement, which claims were
finally rejected by the Court by Summary Judgment For Payment of
Funds On Deposit to Security Investment LTD entered April 22, 1999,
"awarding to Security Investment LTD all funds available as just
compensation herein."

It was further ordered that the Clerk pay
2

the funds on deposit in the sum of $292,350.00 to Securityf stating
that

the

acceptance

by

Security

Investment

LTD

of

the

funds

deposited is without prejudice to any action which it may take with
respect to the determination of its entitlement to any interest on
money deposited with the Clerk, whether such action is by appeal
or by such other remedy as is available.
7. The Clerkf upon advice and direction of the Administrative
Office of The Courts, (AOC) refused to pay any interestf claiming
that the interest was paid upon funds held in trust pursuant to
Section 78-27-4, UCA and Judicial Council Rule 3-407(3)(F) and as
such became a deposit in a restricted account for the Judicial
Council.
8.

The AOC refused to authorize payment of interest to

Security

without

Security's

motion

a

further

for

the

court
payment

order.
of

The

Court

denied

The

accrued

interest.

interest is being held by some officer or agent of the State of
Utahf or held under control of some of the defendants and said
interest or the equivalent thereof should be ordered to be paid to
Security.
9.

For similar reasons, Olson is entitled to interest on

money deposited with the Clerk on May 20, 1997r

in the sum of

$139,300.00, pursuant to an Order of Immediate Occupancy signed May
12, 1997, to be effective when "Plaintiff herein has deposited with
the Clerk of the Courtf for the use and benefit of the defendant
parties

in

interest

herein,

in

the

full

dollar

amount

of

plaintiff's approved appraisal" and to be remitted upon receipt to
3

appropriate defendants.
10.

For similar reasons advanced against Securityf the Clerk

and AOC refused payment of interest to Olson and the Court on June
30 f

1999, granted Olson's motion for payment of the principal

deposited,

howeverf

allowing

Olson

to withdraw

the

principal

without prejudice to the right of appeal on the interest issue.
11.

Security and Olson appealed to the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah in separate appeals, No. 990369, and No. 990652,
which

denied

any

interest

claim

against

UD0Tf

but

stated:

"Moreover, we decline to address defendants1 argument that the
clerk of court, and/or any other persons in control of the monies
deposited by UDOT or any interest earned thereon, should pay such
interest to defendants, as such persons are not parties to this
appeal."
12.

Upon information and belief the plaintiffs allege that

the Clerk and any other persons in control of the monies deposited
by UDOT and the interest thereon, are the defendants named herein,
and to the extent that other persons are later to be found to be
identified as persons in control, the plaintiffs reserve the right
to add such person or persons as defendants herein.
13.
provides:

Article

I

Section

22

of

the

Constitution

of

Utah

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for

public use without just compensation."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Webber v. Salt Lake
City, 40 Utah 221, 120 Pac. 503, (Utah 1911), holds that this
constitutional

provision

is

self-executing
4

and

required

no

legislative aid.
14.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of

Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 66 L
Ed. 2d 101, (1980), held that the county, taking as its own, under
authority of a Florida statute, the interest on money deposited in
an interpleader

fund, is a taking violative of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court
further stated that interest on the deposited fund follows the
principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be
the owners of that principal.
The Supreme Court followed the holding of the Webb's case in
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), where
interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) by statute is paid to
foundations to finance legal services for low-income individuals.
The Supreme Court held that the interest was the property of the
client which is private property of the owner of the principal and
that the taking thereof is violative of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
15.

Any and all of the named defendants individually or in

conjunction with others or each other owe to the plaintiffs all
interest

earned

on

money

deposited

proceedings, and to the extent

in

said

eminent

that it cannot be

domain

reasonably,

accurately calculated, then the interest should be calculated at
the highest legal rate of 10% per annum or in any event at 8% per
annum as provided by Eminent Domain statutes.
16.

The Defendants have violated the civil rights of the
5

Plaintiffs by an unlawful taking of their respective properties
without due process of law contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and their rights under
Article I Section 22 Constitution of Utah,

Section 1983 of Title

42 of the United States Code provides:
1983.

Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
Wherefore, plaintiffs demand judgement against the defendants
having possession and or control of the interest on the deposited
funds.
(1)
on

the

For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned
money

deposited

for

the

use

and

benefit

of

Security

Investment LTD in the original principal sum of $292,350.00;
(2)

For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned

on the money deposited for the use and benefit of William K. olson
in the original principal sum of $139,300.00;
(3)

For

damages

and

attorneys

fees

for

violation

of

plaintiffs' civil rights in taking property by governmental action
without due process of law as proved at trial;
(4)

For costs; and
6

(5)

For such other relief as the plaintiff's may be entitled

to by law.
Dated this jH

day of December, 2000.

I-

iii/M:)i&u<
/

George K. Fadel
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Plaintiff's Addresses:
Security Investment LTD
84 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010
William K. Olson
2301 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 000700491

ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second
Judicial District Court, Farmington Utah; The
STATE OF UTAH by and through its state
treasurer, WILLIAM T. ALTER; its
Administrative Office of the Courts, DANIEL
J. BECKER, Administrator, and THE STATE
OF UTAH, by any officer or agency receiving
interest on funds deposited in courts,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.

1

The Court having considered Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the memorandum
submitted in support thereof; and Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition thereto; and having
heard the arguments of counsel; and being fully advised in the premises, hereby rules as follows:

RULING

A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is a question of law for the Court,
wherein the Court is required to determine if the complaint is legally sufficient on its face. In

making that determination, the Court must assume that the factual allegations in the Complaint
are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
With that in mind, the allegations in the Complaint allege that the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) filed a condemnation action against Plaintiff, Security Investment LTD
and eight others in August of 1997. Pursuant to state law, UDOT also filed a motion for
immediate occupancy, and deposited $290,600.00 with the Clerk of the Court, representing their
estimate of the value of the property condemned. On April 22, 1999, the court on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, determined that all funds deposited belonged to Defendant,
Security Investment LTD, and ordered that the principal sum be dispersed to them without
prejudice to any action which they wished to make with respect to their claim for interest which
accrued on the money while being deposited with the Clerk. The Clerk denied the payment of
any interest based upon Section 78-24-4 U.C.A. and Rule 3-407(3)(F) U.R.J.A.
The complaint also alleges that in April of 1997, UDOT filed a condemnation action
against Plaintiff, William K. Olsen. Pursuant to state law, on May 20, 1997, UDOT filed a
motion for immediate occupancy and deposited $139,300.00 with the Clerk of the Court,
representing their estimate of the value of the property condemned.
On June 30, 1999, the Court granted Olsen's motion to release the principal sum to them
but declined to pay any interest on the sum based upon the same rational as in the Security
Investment matter.
Both Security Investment LTD and Olsen filed a motion with the Court requesting that
interest be paid to them. The Court denied the motion and Plaintiffs appealed the matter to the
Utah Supreme Court in separate appeals, no. 990369 & no. 990652.
2

The Supreme Court in an opinion handed down on December 14, 2000, affirmed the
rulings of the district courts but declined to rule as to whether the Clerk of Court or others would
be obligated to pay the interest as they were not proper parties before the Court.
Section 78-27-4 U.C.A. provides:

(1) (a) Any person depositing money in court, to be held in trust, shall pay it to the court
clerk.
(b) The clerk shall deposit the money in a court trust fund or with the county
treasurer or city recorder to be held subject to the order of the court.
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing the maintenance of court trust funds
and the disposition of interest earnings on those trust funds.
(3) (a) Any interest earned on trust funds that is not required to accrue to the litigants by
Judicial Council rule or court order shall be deposited in a restricted account.
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate funds from that restricted account to the Judicial
Council to:
(i) offset costs to the courts for collection and maintenance of court trust funds;
and
(ii) provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust accounts.

Under the statute, any interest that is not required to accrue to the litigants by Judicial
Council rule or court order is to be deposited in a restricted account. The Legislature shall
appropriate those funds to the Judicial Council to offset costs for collection and maintenance of
court trust funds and to provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust accounts.
Pursuant to Section 78-24-4 U.C.A., the Judicial Council has adopted Rule 3-407(3)(F)
which provides:

(F) Interest bearing.
(i) All trust accounts shall be interest bearing. The administrative office shall develop.
procedures which provide for interest to accrue either to the state or to the litigants in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4(3)(a).
(ii) For trust amounts in excess of $5,000, the court may order or the litigant may
request that such funds be deposited in an interest bearing escrow account. The account
3

shall be at an institution designated by the administrative office unless otherwise ordered
by the court.
(iii) For interest bearing accounts established at the request of the litigant or by court
order, an administrative fee, in an amount established by the Council, shall be assessed.
The account shall be maintained in the name of the court, and the State tax identification
number shall be used. The court shall, in all orders providing for the withdrawal of trust
funds, designate the person or entity to whom the earned interest is awarded.

Subparagraph (i) provides that all accounts shall be interest bearing and requires the
administrative office to develop procedures which provide for interest to accrue to the state or to
the litigants.
Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) establish that when interest bearing escrow accounts are set
up by court order or at the litigants' request, an administrative fee shall be assessed and further
requires that in any order providing for the withdrawal of trust funds, the court shall designate
the person or entity to whom the earned interest is to be awarded.
In the case now presented before the Court, neither of the litigants requested nor did the
courts order that the funds deposited be placed in an interest bearing escrow account, and no
administrative fee was charged to either UDOT or the Plaintiffs here. The sums were therefore
deposited in the restricted accounts as provided under section 78-27-4(3)(a) U.C.A.
The Plaintiffs claim that the interest which accumulated on the proceeds while deposited
with the court is their property and that the court's failure to pay over that interest constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of their property without due process, in violation of the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution; as a result of that taking their civil rights have
been violated under Title 42, Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Further, the retention of the
interest constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
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The Defendants deny all of these claims and filed a Motion to Dismiss, on February 2,
2001. Having heard oral argument and again reviewed the parties' filings, the Court considers
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the following issues: 1) Whether Plaintiffs state a valid
§ 1983 claim; 2) Whether the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by quasi judicial immunity
and/or qualified immunity; 3) Whether Plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Constitution is properly
before the Court; and 4) Whether Collateral Estoppel bars Plaintiffs from relitigating the issue
raised in this lawsuit. The Court looks to applicable law in determination of the issues in turn.
The Court first examines whether Plaintiffs state a valid § 1983 claim. In doing so, the
Court examines whether Defendants are "persons" under § 1983 and whether the Complaint
establishes a specific conduct violating the Plaintiffs' rights, the time and place of the conduct
and the identity of the responsible parties.
Section 1983 provides a remedy against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws...." 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants argue that they are not 'persons' under § 1983. In general, neither a state nor
its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983, and a government entity
that is an arm of the state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. In Will v. Michigan, 491
U.S. 58 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." IdL at 71; Ambus v. Utah State Board of Educ.
858 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1993). A governmental entity that is an arm of the state is not a
5

person within the meaning of § 1983. Harrison v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-6 (10th Cir.
1995). State agencies are considered "an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes."
Hensel v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing, 38 F.3d 505, 508 (10th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the Utah Supreme Court in Ambus, held that
government officials, in fact, can be sued under §1983 for prospective relief, and that the
Defendants holding interest money are continuing to deprive the Plaintiffs of their property.
Ambus, at 1376. Therefore, prospective relief is indicated.
The Court finds that "[governmental officials sued in their official capacities are not
'persons' for purposes of an action for damages under § 1983." Id Where government officials
can be sued for "prospective relief, the Utah Supreme Court's ruling only entails injunctive,
equitable, non-damage types of relief. Id. The Court further finds that interest money a
defendant has not yet tendered does not amount to injunctive, equitable, non-damage types of
relief, and as such, does not amount to "prospective relief1 as set forth in Ambus. Therefore, the
Court finds that the Defendants are not 'persons' under § 1983.
The Court next examines whether Plaintiffs' Complaint establishes an affirmative link
between the alleged deprivation and the Defendants' conduct. A valid claim under § 1983
requires plaintiffs to establish that they have been deprived of a right "secured by the
Constitution and the laws," and then, that the deprivation was under color of state law. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,140 (1979).
Where Plaintiffs argue that interest is a part of just compensation and that the deprivation
of such payments is an unconstitutional taking, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails
to establish that the Defendants caused a deprivation of their established rights, "took" Plaintiffs'
6

property, or that any of the Defendants had a role in developing rules or polices governing the
payment of interest issues. Instead, Plaintiffs Complaint only alleges that the Administrative
Office of the Courts refused to authorize payment of interest based upon Plaintiffs' failure to
comply with Utah Code provisions and Rules of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, Plaintiffs
cannot show, as a matter of law, an unconstitutional taking, because a competent court of law has
already determined that they never perfected their property right in the interest, and therefore,
had no property right in the interest earned on the UDOT funds.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to establish that Defendants caused a
deprivation of the Plaintiffs' rights or that a "taking" of Plaintiff s property occurred. Further
Plaintiffs have failed to provide the Court with any case law supporting their position that § 7827-4 U.C.A. and Rule 3-407(3)(F) U.R.J.A., concerning the payment of interest are
unconstitutional. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that a "taking" has occurred.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to establish an affirmative link
between the alleged deprivation and the Defendants' conduct.
Second, the Court examines whether the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by quasi
judicial immunity and/or qualified immunity. In Ambus, the Utah Supreme Court described
immunity available to government officials. Absolute immunity, the Court held, applies to
provide complete protection from damages liability and "defeats a suit at the outset." IdL at 1377.
Absolute immunity has been extended to judges, prosecutors, legislators, and "officials who
perform functions analogous to those of prosecutors and judges." Id at 1380. This absolute
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"quasi-judicial" immunity also applies to court clerks and "administrative officials who perform
duties that are functionally equivalent to those of court clerks." Id.
Further, "[t]he law provides special protection for officials sued in their individual
capacity for damages under § 1983 for acts committed within the scope of their office. Id,, at
1377. Qualified immunity generally "shields government officials from undue interference with
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." IdL, quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). Qualified immunity shields officials insofar as their conduct does not
"violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Harlow, at 818. The law is clearly established "when it is well developed enough
to inform the reasonable official that his conduct violates that law." Id. Qualified immunity
"gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law." Mallev v. Briegs, 475 U.S. 335. 343 (1986), This
accommodation for reasonable error exists because "officials should not err always on the side of
caution because they fear being sued." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984).
Defendants argue that quasi judicial immunity applies to bar Plaintiffs' suit against
Second District Court Clerk, Allyson Brown, and Utah State Court Administrator, Daniel
Becker. In performing their duties as set forth in the Utah Code and the Rules of Judicial
Administration, these Defendants have been named for performing tasks that are "integral to the
judicial process." Ambus, at 1380. Therefore, they should be free from the tlireat of liability for
performing their official duties. Defendants also argue that qualified immunity also applies to
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bar Plaintiffs' suit against Allyson Brown, Daniel Becker, and State Treasurer, William Alter, in
their individual capacities. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that each Defendant
caused the violation of Plaintiffs' rights which were clearly established at the time of the conduct
at issue. Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996).
On the other hand, Plaintiffs argue that the Governmental Immunity Act specifically
provides that interest is a part of just compensation, and therefore, there can be no immunity of
any of the Defendants from suit for interest withheld and the continuing acts under color of
statute and rules depriving Plaintiffs of just compensation.
The Governmental Immunity Act § 63-30-10.5 provides:

(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property
for public uses without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Title
78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.

Plaintiffs also argue that Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self executing,
and cite Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 635 (1990), Hamblin v. City of
Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990), and Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838, 847
(Utah 1990), in support of their position.
However, the Court finds that the cases cited by the Plaintiff are not applicable in this
instance. These cases are distinguished in that each cause of action arose prior to the enactment
of § 63-30-10.5 under the Governmental Immunity Act, waiving immunity when the
9

governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without
compensation. A further distinction between the cases cited by the Plaintiffs and the matter now
before the Court is the existence of a property right.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs has failed to establish a property right by perfecting their
interest in the interest money, and therefore, may not now claim that they were deprived of that
right. As previously stated, a "taking" did not occur. Therefore, the Court finds that the
Defendants acted within the scope of their office to deny the payment of interest to which
Plaintiffs did not have a right, and are immune from suit.
Third, the Court examines whether Plaintiffs claim under the Utah Constitution is
properly before the Court. Section 63-30-11(2) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the
"Act") reads:

(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.

In addition, the Act requires plaintiffs to file an undertaking at the time of filing the
complaint. U.C.A. 63-30-19. These provisions apply even where the state has waived its
immunity. The Utah Supreme Court has held that filing of the notice of claim is a "jurisdictional
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees." Rushton v. Salt Lake County,
977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). The Act's notice of claim requirement is not subject to
exception, even if the governmental entity at issue has effective notice of the claim. Hall v. Utah
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State Department of Corrections,^. 990529, Filed April 17, 2001; Lamarr. V. Utah Dep't of
Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992); Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d
933 (Utah App. 1994). Failure to file the required undertaking also requires dismissal of the
complaint. Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1991).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to properly file the notice of claim or the
undertaking required under the Act. To the extent that they attempt to state a claim under Utah
law, they have not properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction, and therefore, the state law claims
should be dismissed.
Plaintiffs agree that their claims under § 1983 may be subject to the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, and have informed the Court that they served an additional notice upon the
Defendants on February 7, 2001, and would deposit $300.00 as specified in the Act.
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to properly file the notice of claims or the
undertaking required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and therefore, have not properly
invoked this Court's jurisdiction. Although Plaintiffs have since acted to correct the mistake, the
requirements of the Act must be strictly complied with, and cannot be retroactively cured.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are not properly before the Court.
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' procedural error, the Court finds, as previously discussed, that
Plaintiffs do not have a property right to the interest at issue.
Finally, the Court comes to Defendants' claim of collateral estoppel. Having found that
the Defendants are not 'persons' under § 1983 and are immune from suit; and having found thatPlaintiffs' claims under the Utah Constitution are barred due to a failure to comply with the
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procedural rules of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Court chooses not to address the
issue of collateral estoppel.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs fail to state a valid § 1983 claim. The
Court finds that Defendants are not 'persons' under § 1983, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to
establish that Defendants caused a deprivation of the Plaintiffs' rights or that a "taking" of
Plaintiffs property occurred, and Plaintiff has failed to establish an affirmative link between the
alleged deprivation and the Defendants' conduct. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims against
Defendants Brown and Becker are barred by quasi judicial as well as qualified immunity. The
Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Alter are barred by qualified immunity.
Furthermore, the Court finds Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Constitution are not properly
before the Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defense
counsel is hereby directed by the Court to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the
Court's Ruling, and to submit copies to Plaintiffs' counsel at least five days before submitting it
to the Court.
Dated June Z\

,2001.
BY THE COURT:
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The defendants' Motion to Dismiss this action came before the Court at oral argument
held April 17, 2001. After having considered the argument of counsel and the briefing on the
motion, the Court entered its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on June 21, 2001. The
Court ruled that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek, and
accordingly granted defendants' motion. The Court's findings are as follows:
1.

The State of Utah and the Administrative Office of the Courts, and defendants
Brown, Alter and Becker in their official capacities, are not "persons" under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

2.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite affirmative causal link between the
actions of defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injuries.

3.

Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the UDOT interest funds at issue.
Having no property right, there was no unconstitutional taking of plaintiffs'
property, and therefore no violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

4.

Defendants Brown and Becker are entitled to quasi-judicial and qualified
immunity.

5.

Defendant Alter is entitled to qualified immunity.

6.

The Court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and
DECREES that:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

2.

All of plaintiffs' claims against defendants asserted in this lawsuit are dismissed

on their merits, with prejudice.

2

3.

Judgment is entered in favor of the defendants.

Entered this 2>™ day of Qjn.rtitft'JC • 20° 1 •
BY THE COURT:

Rodney S. Pag£
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this Qsb

day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT to be mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid
to:

George K. Fadel
Fadel Associates
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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78-27-4

JUDICIAL CODE

instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the amounts,
terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conditions.
Interest.
Tender.
— By check.
— By mail.
Conditions.
A tender, to be good, must be free from any
condition which the tenderer does not have a
right to insist upon. Sieverta v. White, 2 Utah
2d 351, 273 R2d 974 (1954).
Interest.
If tender is made of full face of account, and
no demand for interest is made, interest, at
least for the purposes of a tender, is waived.
Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah
434, 160 P. 283 (1916).
Tender.
— By check.
Where a tender is made by check, the person

to whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he will be deemed to have waived all
objections, except such as he insists upon when
tender is made. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet
Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283 (1916). See also
Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367,275 R2d
170(1954).
A check for the amount due, presented within
time and when no exception is taken to the
form of the tender, is a valid and legal tender of
the amount due, but only when there are adequate funds in the account of the drawer to
pay such check upon presentation in due
course. Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273
R2d 974 (1954).
- B y mail.
Tender of check by mail is good tender in
absence of special objections. Hirsh v. Ogden
Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283
(1916).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. - 74 Am. Jur. 2d lender § 10.
C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Tender §§ 12, 17, 26, 34,
38, 43.

Key Numbers. — Tender «=» 15(3).

78-27-4. Money deposited in court,
(1) (a) Any person depositing money in court, to be held in trust, shall pay
it to the court clerk.
(b) The clerk shall deposit the money in a court trust fund or with the
county treasurer or city recorder to be held subject to the order of the
court.
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing the maintenance of
court trust funds and the disposition of interest earnings on those trust funds.
(3) (a) Any interest earned on trust funds that is not required to accrue to
the litigants by Judicial Council rule or court order shall be deposited in a
restricted account.
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate funds from that restricted account to the Judicial Council to:
(i) offset costs to the courts for collection and maintenance of court
trust funds; and
(ii) provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust
accounts.
436

Art V, § 1

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
History: Const 1896.
Compiler's Notes. — The quotation marks
at the end of this section have been carried in
brackets in all compilations since Revised Statutes of 1898

Cross-References. — Oaths of officers,
§ 52 1 1

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

of oath form duly notarized by a deputy county
clerk (a person duly authorized to administer
o a t h 8 ) although he did not go through some
formal ritual, with the raising of his right
h a n d S u t e v M a t h e W 8 t 1 3 U t a h 2 d 391, 375
P2
<1 392 (1962)

Bond required in addition to oath
Formal ritual unnecessary
Supreme Court justices required to take oath
Bond required in addition to oath.
Statute requiring state treasurer to give
bond is not unconstitutional on ground that
Legislature could not add to requirement in
this section State ex rel Stain v Chnstensen,

Su

e Court justiceg

oath
*..J "
,. J u d g e "
h,8

to

take

r n. a
^ ^
.
.
,the S u P r e m e C o u r t "ub8C"bf

wh n ente
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84 Utah 185, 35 P2d 775 (1934)

'

Formal ritual unnecessary.
A deputy county recorder took the oath of
office, required by this section, by his signing

Cntchlow v Monson, 102 Utah 378, 131 P 2d
794 For sequel to this case, see State ex rel
Jugler v Grover, 102 Utah 459, 132 P 2d 125
(1942)

f
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 67 C J S Officers and Public Employees § 46
Key Numbers. — Officers ** 36(1)

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section
1 [Three departments of government 1

Section 1. [Three departments of government]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
History: Const 1896.
Crosa-References. — Executive department, Utah Const., Art. VII.
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art VIII.

Legislative department, Utah Const, Art
VI.
Municipal powers not delegable, Utah
Const., Art. VI, § 28.
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MISCELLANEOUS

Art. XXII, § 1

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officera and Employees § 431 et seq.

C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees §§ 219, 224.
Key Numbers. — Officers *=» 94, 99.

Sec- 2. [Legislature to provide fees — Accounting.]
The Legislature shall provide by law for the fees to be collected by all
officers within the state. All state, district, county, city, town, and school
officers shall be required by law to keep a true and correct account of all fees
collected by them, and to pay the same into the proper treasury, and the
officer whose duty it is to collect such fees shall be held responsible under his
bond for the same.
History: C o n s t 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.IL 1.
Cross-References. — Fees, Title 21.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

by law. State ex rel. Richards v. Stanton, 14
Utah 180, 46 P. 1109 (1896).

County clerks.
Justices of the peace.

Justices of the peace.
This section should be construed in connection with Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26, in determining right of legislature to regulate cornpensation of justices of the peace. Martineau v.
Crabbe, 46 Utah 327, 150 P. 301 (1915).

County clerks.
This section, and section immediately preceding, limit compensation to be paid county
clerks to such suras as legislature shall provide

ARTICLE XXII
MISCELLANEOUS
Section
1. [Homestead exemption.)
2. (Property rights of married women.]

Section
3. [Seat of government.!

Section 1. [Homestead exemption.]
The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead,
which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon, from sale on execution.
History: Const 1896; L. 1988, S.J.R. 4.
Cross-References. — Homestead, what
constitutes, H 75-2-401, 78-23-3.
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REVENUE AND TAXATION

Art. XIII, § 5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am Jur 2d State and
Local Taxation § 218

C.J.S. — 84 C J S Taxation §§ 68, 73, 170
Key Numbers. — Taxation *=» 63, 158

Sec. 5. [Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax
and revenues by political subdivisions.]
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city,
town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution, political subdivisions may share their tax and
other revenues with other political subdivisions as provided by statute.
County taxing power, § 17-4-3
Revenue sharing between political subdivi
sions, § 11-13-16 5

History: C o n s t 1896; L. 1982, S.J.R. 3.
Cross-References. — Appropriations and
tax limitation, § 59-17a-101 et seq.
City taxing power, Utah Const, Art XI, sec
5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Corporate authorities" construed.
"Corporate authorities," as used in this section, are those municipal officers who either
are directly elected by municipality's inhabitants or are appointed in some mode to which
such inhabitants have given their assent. State
ex rel. Wright v Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P
1061 (1901).

ANALYSIS

Agricultural extension work.
Allocation of future tax.
"Corporate authorities" construed.
Court fees.
Dependent mothers.
Discriminatory tax.
Excess revenue refunds.
License fees.
Purpose of taxation.
Utah Neighborhood Development Act
Water district.
Agricultural extension work.
Statute (Comp. Laws 1917, 5 5292) authorizing contracts between trustees of state agricultural college and county commissioners with
respect to agricultural extension work, and authorizing commissioners to provide funds necessary for the work in their respective counties, was not invalid as imposing a tax for
county purposes by the legislature. Bailey v.
Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925).
Allocation of future tax.
The law is well settled that in exercising the
powers of the state, the legislature may require
the revenue of a municipality to be applied to
uses other than that for which the taxes were
levied; thus there was no constitutional transgression in the allocation of certain expected
tax increments (generated by new construction
in an area of urban blight) for repayment of
Redevelopment Agency bonds. Tribe v. Salt
Lake City Corp, 540 P2d 499 (Utah 1975).

Court fees.
The provisions of this section were contravened by statute which attempted to fix schedule of county clerks' fees for services in probate
matters based on sliding scale where fees increased as values of estates increased, since
such attempt was an imposition of taxes without uniformity for counties' use and benefit
Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P 2d
259, 108 A.L.R. 513 (1936).
Dependent mothers.
The phrase "for all purposes of such corporation," is synonymous with the phrase, "public
purposes," and Chapter 13 of Title 17 (Public
Aid for Dependent Mothers) would be upheld
as "public purpose." Denver & R.G.R.R. v.
Grand County, 61 Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 3
A.L.R. 1224 (1917).
Discriminatory tax.
A city licensing ordinance which was a revenue-raising measure and put some of the businesses affected on a flat fee basis with only
about one-twelfth as much tax as other businesses which paid on a sales tax basis was unconstitutionally discriminatory Orem City v.
Pyne, 16 Utah 2d 355, 401 P 2d 181 (1965)
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CONSTITUTION
of the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENT 5
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and
just compensation clauses.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
CROSS REFERENCES
Constitutional right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation,
generally, USCS Constitution, Amendment 6.
Prohibition against state's denial of due process or equal protection, USCS
Constitution, Amendment 14.
Grand jury procedure, generally, USCS Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
6.
Procedure as to indictment and information, generally, USCS Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 7.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure L Ed:
Access to District Courts, Fed Proc, L Ed § 1:466.
Administrative Procedure, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 2:27, 2:60, 2:121, 2:143.
Appeal, Certiorari, and Review, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 5:109, 5:403.
Arbitration, Fed Proc, L Ed § 8:2.
Armed Forces, Civil Disturbances, and National Defense, Fed Proc, L
Ed §§ 9:369; 10:64.
1

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Art. I, § £ 2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appointment of administrator of estate.
This section prohibits the appointment of a
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's
estate if that person refuses to consent to such
appointment. In re Estate of duff, 587 P.2d
128 (Utah 1978).
Withholding tax.
Provision requiring that a city withhold
state income taxes due from employees does
not subject the city to involuntary servitude.
Salt Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961).

ANALYSIS

In general.
Appointment of administrator of estate.
Withholding tax.
In general.
No man can have a vested interest in the
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to
insist that another work for him, since that
would violate this section. McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Involuntary
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq.

C.J.S, — 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 3; 80 C.J.S.
Slaves § 10.
Key Numbers. — Slaves <=> 24.

Sec, 22, [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
—TRatory: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation, and does not
require compensation to be paid in advance.
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379,
503 P.2d 144 (1972).

ANALYSIS

Advance payment of compensation.
Airplane overflights.
Closing street.
Consequential damages.
—Railroad.
—Road construction.
—School construction.
Defense to condemnation proceeding.
Elements of taking or damage.
Fair market value.
Section self-executing.
Highway easement.
Intangible factors.
Interest in condemnation proceedings.
Inverse condemnation.
Just compensation.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Removal of personal property.
Services of attorney in defending indigent.
Statute of limitations.
Taxes.
Water rights.
Cited.

Airplane overflights.
For discussion of taking issues in an action
by landowners alleging that their land has
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah
1986).

Advance payment of compensation.
This section provides merely that the prop-

Closing street.
Where city, without notice, petition, or hearing, closes a portion of a street and alley abutting on school board-owned property on both
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned property, there has been a taking requiring just
compensation. Boskovich v. Mid vale City
Corp., 121 UUh 445, 243 P.2d 435 (19527.
Closing of city street and alleged impairment of access to commercial properties was
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the meaning of this section; the alleged damages resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art I, § 6

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Mootnees Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L Rev 266
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L Rev 328
Post-Conviction Procedure Act Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L Rev 695
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am Jur 2d Habeas Corpus §5 6 to 7

C.J.S. — 16A C J S Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq , 39 C J S Habeas Corpus § 5
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A L R 3 d 301
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=»
83(1), 121 to 123

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd 8.S.),
SJf.lt 3.
Compiler's Note*. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd SS), § 2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

Prospective application
Regulation of right to bear arms
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P 2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v Beorchia, 630 P 2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751
Am. J u r . 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms 5 4.
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S Constitutional Law
} 611; 94 OJ.S. Weapons 8 2.

A.L.H. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R 3d 845
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 AL.R4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 82;
Weapons *= 1, 3, 6 et seq

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
ofjaw,
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq
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78-34-9

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. — 29A C J S Eminent Domain § 267
etseq

78-34-9.

Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain «=»
198(1)

Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit paid into court — Procedure for payment
of compensation.

The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the
condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75%
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to be
condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only,
and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of just
compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded as
provided in Section 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and the
said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest
at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the
property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date ofjudgment; but
interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into
court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court shall order that
the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a defendant as
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses
excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the compensation finally
awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the
amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment against the
plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency. If the amount of money so received by
the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the court shall enter
judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. Upon the filing
of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the time within
which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall be required
to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such orders in
respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and other
charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 9 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-9; L. 1967, ch. 220, { 1.

Cross-References. — Officers before whom
affidavits may be taken, § 78-26-5
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